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STATE IDENTITY, TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY AND PARTY
BANNING: THE CASE OF A PAN-ARAB
POLITICAL PARTY IN ISRAEL

Ron Harris*
The banningofpolidealpardesin democrades, something which seemed
to be a matter of the past, has reemerged in recentyears in many
countries,from Germany to Turkey, from Britain to Israel,andfrom
Spain to Latvia. The present artick tells the story of an encounter in
the years between 1959 and 1965, between the pan-Arab national
movement El Ard and the Israeli executive andjudidal branches.
According to the author's interpretation of its history, El Ard was
what he calls a "thirdgenerationparty" based on his categorisation of
pary objecdves and means. It sought to alter the identity of Israel in a
radical manner. Yet it was not assodated expliitly with organisations
or states that aimed at destructing Israel or altering its identity as a
Jewish state.
The article elaborates on the question of how to interpretthe objectives
of a pary; it grapples with the question of what constitutes support
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for terror and for the use of violence; it raises issues related to the
nature of separaism, irredenta, andpan-nadonalism;itproblemadses
the test for adherence to democratic principles; and it deals with the
effects of emergency and post-war situations. The case study places in
thick context, with ample nuances, the dilemmas and doubts involved
in the ban of poliicalparties, which have recently came to preoccupy
many governments and courts
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Introduction
The present article tells the story of an encounter, in the years 1959-1965,
between the pan-Arab national movement El Ard ("The Land") and the
executive and judicial branches of the state in Israel. Asserting that the
movement's objectives threatened the existence of the State of Israel and its
territorial integrity, the executive took a variety of measures to limit the
movement's political activity. These included shutting down its newspaper,
declaring it an illegal association and refusing to register the movement as a
corporation. Litigation became a major form of political activity for El Ard.
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Cases of the lArd movement reached the Israeli Supreme Court six times
between the years 1960 and 1965. The success was mixed. Finally, the
movement's list of candidates for the 1965 general elections was disqualified
by the elections Committee and the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, by a
majority, approved the decision. This effectively banned the movement from
participating in Israel's political process.
This article does not purport to present a comprehensive
discussion of, or recommend a desired set of rules in matters of
speech, freedom of association, and access to the electoral arena
parties. Yet the case presented here can contribute to normative
discussions on these topics in contemporary discourse.

I.

normative
freedom of
by political
and policy

The Recent Debates on Bans in Democracies

I wish to argue that it is possible to identify three types of political parties,
based on their objectives, that were subject to bans in the post-World War II
period. The first type consists of parties that aim at altering the democratic
form of government once elected democratically. The second type is that of
parties that aim to change the borders of pre-existing states by advocating
cessation. The third type is that of parties that aim at changing fundamental
principles that compose the core identity of states. In fact, the three types
appeared chronologically and can be termed the three generations of political
parties.
Another perspective from which parties can be identified is the issue of
means. Here again, three types of means can be identified. The first type intention to use force and violence in order to promote its objectives - is the
oldest that may be identified, and the easiest to justify based on liberal principles.
The second type is that of separation between a political party and a military
wing. The political party promotes objectives similar to those of the military
wing, but does not call for the use of force. The third type is that of a political
party that promotes objectives that are similar to those promoted by other
organisations that use or support the use of force; however, the party is neither
21
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connected to these other organisations, and nor does it denounce the use of
force by the other organisation.'
A common liberal view is that political parties should be banned only if
they pose a threat to democracy in a direct and immediate way.2 The paradigmatic
case is that of a party that aims at rising to power using democratic means with
the intention to then use its majority in order to abolish the democracy. The
German Nazi party is the prime example of such a practice. Fascist parties
elsewhere in Europe serve as other examples. Similar concerns about the
abolition of democracy were raised with respect to Communist parties in
Europe. I would call such concerns, which preoccupied democracies and scholars
in the post World War II period, as first generation concerns.
A more problematic issue that became more prevalent in the 1970s and
1980s concerned the claims of territorial minorities for self-determination. The
attempt by states to ban secessionist parties on the basis of claims to territorial

A fourth type that is beyond the current discussion and examples is that of a party
that does all that it can to denounce the use of force and to disassociate itself from

the organisation that uses force.
2

3

Gregory H. Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 36 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 1, 70
(1995); Peter Niesen, AntiExtremism, Negative Republicanism, CivicSociety: Three Paradigms
for Banning PoliticalParties, 3 GERMAN L.J, 1 (2002); Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile
Democracies, 120 HARV. L.R. 1405 (2007).
In both Germany and Italy, constitutional provisions were established to exclude
Nazi and Fascist parties from participating in the elections. The German provision
was drafted with wider applicability, allowing the banning of political parties aiming
to impair or destroy the free democratic order. Based on this law, both a National
Socialist party (SRP) and the Communist Party (KPD) were banned in 1951. It was
used again in 2003 to ban a radical right wing party (NPD). The ban was not confirmed
by the German Constitutional Court on evidentiary grounds. The outlawing and
banning of Neo-Nazi and Neo-Fascist parties was considered and exercised elsewhere
in Europe.
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integrity can be viewed as the second generation concern. The banning of the
Basque party in Spain in 2003 is a paradigmatic example of such a concern.' In
Turkey, two separatist Kurdish parties were prevented from taking part in political
life on the grounds that they supported Kurdish self-determination and were
affiliated with the terrorist group PKK.s
It has become clear in recent years that in many democracies, efforts to
ban political parties are not just a thing of the past. They are more widespread
in recent years than at any other time in the past since 1945. Banning of political
parties has been a debated issue in Britain, Australia, Denmark and the
Netherlands;" it has been legislated upon and has been subject to judicial review

4

In 2003, in Spain, the right to be elected was denied to Batasuna, the Basque separatist
party. The ban was based on Batasuna's support for ETA and its use of violence.
Spain's Supreme Court and Constitutional Court approved the ban. It was the first
Spanish political party to be banned since the death of Francisco Franco in 1975. In

May 2004 Spain's Supreme Court upheld a ban on the Basque nationalist party
Herritarren Zerrenda from participating in European elections. The court stated in
its ruling that ETA and its banned political party Batasuna were organising political,

social, and financial support for the Herritarren Zerrenda party. The Spanish
Constitutional Court reaffirmed the ban shortly before the June elections. As it involves
elections to the European Parliament, this move is likely to be litigated and debated
on the level of the European Union as well.
These bans have reached the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and are a
factor in the ongoing negotiations between Turkey and the EU.
6

I shall elaborate on the British case to provide a concrete example. Higb ut-Tabriris
a Sunni, anti-nationalist, pan-Islamist political party whose goal is to unite all Muslim
countries in a unitary Islamic state or caliphate Tony Blair announced after the 7
July, 2005 London bombings the intention to ban the organisation in Britain under
new legislation. But eventually the British government abandoned this intention. The
British National Party (BNP) is a far-right white nationalist party. While there was no
operative initiative to ban it, parties and organisations in Britain used a variety of
measures, on the speech, association and other levels to stop its activities.

23

Vol. 4

Sodo-LegalReview

2008

in Turkey, the Ukraine, Latvia, Israel, India, Australia and Britain.' The latest
episodes that evoked claims about limits on political-participation and for calls
to ban certain political parties are concerned with the identity of the state. I will
typify these identity issues as third generation issues.
For example, the identity question in Turkey is secularity. The question
here is whether a party that wishes to alter the fundamental principle of the
secularity of the state can take part in the democratic process? The Welfare
Party (Refah Partist) was banned, while still in opposition, by Turkey's
Constitutional Court in 1998. The Court held that the party's objectives, such
as the institution of Sharia law and a theocratic regime, contradict the
fundamental principle of secularism that was entrenched in Turkey's
Constitution. This case reached the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),
which refused to rule against Turkey. Most recently, the Turkish Chief Prosecutor
petitioned for the banning of the ruling moderate and conservative Justice and
Development Party. The prosecutor claimed that the attempt to amend the
secularism clauses of the constitution is prohibited and that statements by party
leaders saying that that courts and the constitution have no right to disallow the
public use of headscarf indicate that they view religious law as supreme. The
petition is now pending a review by the constitutional court.

'

The United States is exceptional in that limitations on participation in the political
process did not become a public and legal issue in recent years. Its federal and
presidential political system that gave rise to a stable two parties system may be the

main reason. Issues of separatism or of Muslim political activities were not prominent
in the United States. The entrenchment of the Constitution prevented the ban on

participation in the elections. According to the Constitution, only Congress could ban
a member, only after he was elected, by excluding him from entering office. It could
do this only individually on a case by case basis and not by banning a party from
participating in the elections. Famously, Marxist and Communist politicians were
restricted at the political speech and political association levels, in Red Scare eras,
before a ban on participation in elections became an issue. These restrictions were at
their height during the era of McCarthyism. They were accompanied by criminal
prosecution of Communist and alleged Communist leaders.

24
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The right of non-separatist national minority candidates to be elected
became an issue in Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War and the rolling
back of Russian dominance. Eastern Europe has a complex and substantial
structure of ethnic and linguistic minorities that are often non-territorial and
have no separatist inspirations. In this context, the issue at hand is often the
significance of the role given to the minority's identity in the State. For instance,
in the newly independent states that were part of the former Soviet Union, the
question is often whether the identity of the state will be that of the majority
group. Factors such as ties with Russia, the role of the Russian language and
citizenship laws are at stake. For example, a non-Latvian speaking candidate,
member of a party whose aim was to advance the interests of the Russianspeaking minority, was removed from the list because she allegedly did not
meet the Latvian language qualification requirement in the law. This case reached
the ECHR, which held Latvia in violation of the European Convention.
Another example is that of the Hib ut-Tabir, a Sunni Islamist political
party whose main goal is to establish a caliphate in the Middle East (based on
Islamic law), in order to unite the Muslim world. The limits on the political
activities of the HiZb ut-Tabrir,along with the reasons provided and the forms
of these limits, has been heatedly debated in recent years in several Western
countries with significant Muslim population. On one hand, it has been argued
that the party doesn't aim at forming theocratic regimes in the Western countries
in which it is active, and that the desire to make the caliphate a dominant power
in the world is irrelevant for a domestic ban; furthermore, it is so unrealistic
that the party should not be banned for promoting theocratic or anti-democratic
views. On the other hand, it was argued, for example, in Denmark, that the
party promoted racial hatred and manifested extreme anti-Semitic opinions, up
to the point of calling for the killing of all the Jews or making them second rate
subjects of the caliphate. In Germany, the allegation of cooperation with neoNazi NPD party was a second motivation for imposing a ban on some of its
political activities. In Britain and Australia, the demands for a ban relied primarily
on the party's ambiguous position with respect to the terrorist attacks that were
inflicted on their civilians in recent years and on implicit threats attributed to
the party in order to generate riots in Muslim populated suburbs.
25
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Parties in various countries are placed in Table 1 along two dimensions,
that of the objects of the party, and that of the means it uses and endorses. The
objects are often subject to different interpretations. The means are often
presented by the parties as non-violent and disconnected from violent
organisations; on the other hand, they are presented by the state as involving
violence or at least association with, or endorsement of, violence. A tabular
presentation of complex phenomena as political movements requires some
simplification. For the purpose of this table, I have used the characteristics that
the various states attributed to political parties they wished to ban. This does
not necessarily reflect the parties' self conceptions or my understanding of the
parties.
Table 1

Use of Violence

Change Democratic
Form of
Government

Change
Borders

SRP (National
Socialist, Germany)

PKK (Kurdish
Party, Turkey)

Change
Identity

KPD (Communist
Party, Germany)
Association with

SRP (Germany)

a Fraction that
Uses Violence

Batasuna

Higb ut-Tabrir

(Basque, Spain)

Justice and
Development
Party (Turkey)
Welfare Party
(Turkey)

No Association
with Organisations
and States that
Use Violence

NPD (Germany)
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The renewed interest in the limits on participation in the political process
in democracies has been reflected in academic discourse.' The German, Basque,
Turkish and Israeli cases have received most of the attention. In the United
States, the discourse is gaining momentum as part of the discussion of
democratisation and of fragile democracies. While the immediate post-World
War II interest was concentrated in the top left cell of the table, recent interest
is shifting to the bottom right cell.
The case of ElArd is interesting because it involved a party that typified
the third category along both dimensions. It was a party that aimed at changing
the core identity principles of a state. It was a party that was not associated
with organisations that used force but identified with their objectives and did
not condemn them. This intersection raises some of the most interesting and
difficult issues about ipolitical participation. The case of El Ard is remarkable
also because it was a very early case which falls into the bottom left cell of the
table. It presents factual complexities that were not matched by other cases
until recently.

II. The Basic Narrative
In the first decade of the State of Israel (1948-58), the political activity of
the Arab minority was confined to joint Jewish-Arab parties. The establishment
of ElArd ("The Land") at in 1959 as an Arab only party was a new phenomenon
in the Israeli political landscape. ElArd offered a pan-Arab national platform,
as opposed to a socialist or communist one offered by alternative opposition
parties attracting Arab voters. BlArd was not satisfied with struggling for the
equal rights of Arab citizens within the State of Israel. It challenged the identity
of Israel as a Jewish state. It challenged its borders that were shaped by the
1947-49 war. ElArd struggled on three fronts to establish its political status:
against the Israeli authorities, against traditional Arab society, and against the
Communist Party (Mak).At first, ElArdwas organised as an extra-parliamentary

8

See sources cited supra note 2.
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political movement, and it did not run for Parliament (the "Knesset") in 1959
and 1961. Its activity consisted of the publication of newspapers and manifestos,
membership drives, the organisation of meetings and assemblies, and the
development of an organisational and financial infrastructure. These were
intended to allow the party to promote its objectives, which shall be discussed
below. It was only on the eve of the 1965 elections that the movement submitted
a list of candidates for the Knesset.
The Israeli authorities tried various methods to restrict the activities of El
Ard throughout the years of its existence. The movement chose to confront
these attempts by legal means.9 As a result, several attempts to limit El Ard
activities were tested in the Supreme Court, which handed down six important
decisions in cases involving ElArd over a five year period (1960-1965).
The group continued to operate in the years 1960-1962 in two dimensions:
a request for a licence to publish a weekly, and a request to incorporate as a
limited liability, for-profit company in the business of printing and publishing
newspapers and books. When the request for a publishing licence was denied,
the group petitioned the High Court of Justice against the District Supervisor
of the Interior Ministry, but the Court rejected the plea.'o However, when the
group filed a petition against the Registrar of Companies who refused to register
the company, the Court granted the petition by a majority of two to one." The
Attorney General asked for further consideration and appeared in person before

9

JACOB M. LANDAU, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL: A POLITICAL STUDY 111-124 (1971); SABI
JIRYs, THE ARABS IN ISRAEL (1966); PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF
JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIsT CENTURY 252-272 (1997); Y Amitai, The
Arab Minority in Israel: The Years of Militay Rule, 1948-1966, in INDEPENDENCE - THE
FIRsT Firry YEARS 108 (Anita Shapira ed.,1998).

10

HCJ 39/64 El Ard Company, Ltd. v. Commissioner of Northern District [1964]
IsrSC 18(2) 340 [hereinafter the El Ard, Ltd. case].

"

HCJ 241/60 Mansur Tewfik Kardosh v. Registrar of Companies [19611 IsrSC 15(2)
1151 [hereinafter the Kardosh case].
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a larger panel of five justices. The High Court of Justice did not change its
decision, and this time with a majority of three to two instructed the registrar to
incorporate El Ard Ltd."
The movement, which was unsuccessful in publishing a newspaper,
continued to operate at a lower level: it created branch offices, organised rallies,
and marketed shares of El Ard Ltd. in order to expand its membership. In 1962,
El Ard decided to raise its level of visibility by a notch: it began appealing to
the Secretary General of the United Nations, to the international press, and to
foreign ambassadors in Israel." The movement also received open support from
Radio Cairo, that broadcasted anti-Israeli propaganda in both Arabic and Hebrew
to Israel. In 1964, it announced that it was organising itself as an Ottoman
Association - a non-commercial, not-for-profit association - possibly in
preparation to organising as a political party and running for the Knesset. This
was because this type of organisation was more suitable for political activity
than a for-profit corporation. The District Supervisor of the Interior Ministry
informed the members of ElArd that the organisation of the movement as an
association was not permitted. ElArd again petitioned the High Court of Justice.
This time the Court decided unanimously to reject the plea and to forbid the
movement from organising itself as an association." Shortly afterwards, several
of the prominent activists of the movement were arrested, and the Minister of
Defense declared the ElArd movement illegal by a decree based on the State
of Emergency Regulations, which had been enacted in 1945 by the British
Mandatory government.'"

12

HCJ 16/61 Further Consideration Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh [1962] IsrSC

17(2) 1209 [hereinafter the Kardosh Further Consideration case].
13

14

is

Regarding the non-legal activities of the movement, see HCJ 253/64Jirys v. Supervisor
of Haifa District [1965] IsrSC 18(4) 673 [hereinafter the Jirys case].

Id.
Defense .(Emergency) Regulations, 1945, KT 1442, 855 [hereinafter Defense
(Emergency) Regulations].
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In 1965, ElArd decided to run in the elections to the sixth Knesset under
a somewhat misleading name: "The Socialists List." The Israeli Central Elections
Commission disqualified the list claiming that its candidates were members in
an illegal association, which was banned, and that the objectives of the
association threatened the existence of the State of Israel and its territorial
integrity. The matter reached the Supreme Court, which rejected the appeal
with a majority of two to one and let the disqualification stand.' This was the
first case in Israel's history in which a political party was banned from running
in the election. With almost all legal means at its disposal disallowed, and its
main activists dispersed, the El Ard movement then ceased to exist for all
practical purposes."

III. The Historical Context
The UN Partition Resolution of 1947 and the Arab-Israeli War of 194749 led to the formation of the State of Israel in large parts of the territory of
the British Mandate of Palestine and to the control of Egypt on the Gaza Strip
and of Jordan in the West Bank. The Arab-Palestinian minority in Israel received
citizenship that included the right to vote by secret ballot. Much of the Arab
minority was placed under military rule from 1949 until 1966. It faced a variety
of informal obstacles in organising independent political parties. Arabs voted
mainly for three parties: Arab affiliate parties of the ruling Mapai, a centrelabour party headed by Prime Minister Ben Gurion; Mapam, a left-socialist party;

16

17

EA 1/65 Yaakov Yeredor v. Chairman of the Central Election Commission for the
Sixth Knesset [1965] IsrSC 19(3) 365 [hereinafter the Yeredor case].
One of the leaders of the movement, Habib Qa'uqji, later joined the Syrian intelligence
service, and was claimed to have recruited the network of Jewish-Arab spies that
was captured in the early 1970s. Another leader, Sabri Jirys, joined the PLO, began
researching the Jewish-Arab conflict, and returned to Israel only after the signing of
the Oslo accords. See LAHAv, supra note 9, at 399.
30
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and Maki, the Communist Party (that was at the time supported by the Soviet
Union)."
The most radical option open to Arab voters was the Communist Party. El
Ard was initially formed in 1959 by a splinter group of the Communist Party. It
was composed of Arab activists who wished to create a nationalist, pan-Arab
and exclusively Arab political party. Its formation reflected the widening cleavage
within the Arab world between the pro-Soviet line of the Iraqi President Kassem
and the pan-Arab line of the Egyptian President Abd al Nasir. As El Artis
members supported Nasir, they could not join forces with the Communists any
more. The Communist party was split into two fractions in 1965. One of the
fractions, RAKAH, remained pro-Soviet and was predominantly Arab in
leadership and voters. The other, MAKI, renounced Soviet dogma and was
supported mostly by Jewish voters. Many of the Arab activists that joined
RAKAH viewed the Soviet support to the establishment of Israel in 1947-48
as a "Stalinist mistake". They rejected the UN Partition Resolution and viewed
Israel as an Anglo-American imperialist bridgehead. The formation of the proSoviet, anti-Zionist and more radical RAKAH party attracted more Arab voters
to the party. It may have triggered ElArd's decision to turn into a political party
that ran a list of candidates in the general elections.
After the defeat in the 1948 war, the failure to establish an independent
state and the massive deportation and flight of refugees from the newly
established Israel, the Palestinian national movement was eclipsed. Only in
early 1960, a revival of Palestinian identity and inspirations began. The creation
of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1964 and the founding of
EI-Fatah as a political-military organisation by Yasser Arafat in 1965 signalled

18

For party organisation and voting patterns among the Arab minority in Israel see
LANDAU, supra note 9; JIRYS, supra note 9; AMITAI, supra note 9; IAN LusTue, ARAj3S IN
THE JEWISH STATE, ISRAEL'S CONTROL OF A NATIONAL MINORITY (1980); Uzi
BENZIMAN & ATALLAH MANSOUR, SUBTENANTS: ISRAELI ARABS, THEIR STATUS, AND
THE POLIcY TOWARD THEM

(1992); ORI
(1992).
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the revival of the Palestinian national movement. The PLO National Charter
of 1964 declared that the establishment of Israel was illegal, null and void, that
Palestine could not be divided, and that the Jews had no right to establish a
state in Palestine." The establishment of the PLO was sponsored by the Arab
League. The Charter reflected a dual commitment both to local Palestinian
nationality and to pan-Arab nationality.
The context in which El Ard was formed was one of growing tension
between Communism and pan-Arabism in the Arab world, and between
Communism and nationalism among the Arab minority in Israel. The turning of
the ElArd from an extra-parliamentary political movement to a political party
should be understood within the context of the split in the Communist Party
between the more moderate, predominantly Jewish wing and the more radical,
predominantly Arab wing. It should also be understood in the context of the
revival of the Palestinian national movement outside Israel. El Ard thus
established itself as the first Arab national and pan-Arab political movement in
Israel. Its platform should be understood in these contexts as one that aimed to
distinguish itself not only from mainstream communism but also from RAKAH,
the more radical, anti-Zionist and Arab branch of communism; at the same
time it aimed at affiliating El Ard with the rising pan-Arab and Palestinian
nationalism.

IV. The Party's Objectives
The legal discussion of the objectives of ElArd generally focused on the
"Objectives" section in the articles of organisation of the El Ard association,
and primarily on objectives C and D, which stated the following:
C.

"

Finding a just solution to the Palestinian problem - by seeing it
as an indivisible unit - according to the will of the Arab
Palestinian people, that provides an answer to its interests and

See, e.g., Palestinian National Charter arts. 2-4,6-7,16-17, availabkat http://www.un.int/
palestine/PLO/PNA2.html (last visited July 18, 2008).
32
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aspirations, returns to it its political existence, ensures its full
and legal rights, and regards it as owner of the primary right to
determine its destiny within the supreme aspirations of the Arab
nation.
D.

Support for the liberation, unification, and socialist movement
in the Arab world, through all legal means, by seeing that
movement as a determining force in the Arab world, and requiring
Israel to consider it in a positive way.

Security and law enforcement agencies in Israel claimed that these two
objectives must be interpreted to mean that El Ard categorically denied the
right of the State of Israel to exist and sought to establish an Arab-Palestinian
state in the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine. El Ard's attorney in the
Jiryo and Yeredo?' cases (to be discussed below), Dr. Yaakov Yeredor, offered
an entirely different interpretation, according to which the State of Israel already
existed and hence there was no need to recognise its right to exist; on the other
hand, the Arab people had not yet obtained their state and it was for this reason
that their right to a political existence was mentioned. But Dr. Yeredor, in his
interpretation, did not address the question of what the boundaries of the
Palestinian political entity would be, and the nexus between it and the Arab
nation as a whole.'
Justice Vitkon, speaking for the court in the firys decision, ruled that the
objective of the movement "denies totally and completely the existence of the
State of Israel in general, and particularly the existence of the state within its
present borders."23 In the Yeredor case, Chief Justice Agranat reiterated the

20

The Jirys case, supra note 13.

21

The Yeredor case, supra note 16.
For a similar commentary, see also the actual text of the articles of organisation as
submitted to the Supreme Court in the Jirys case, quoted by Jirys, supra note 9, at
118-119.
The Jirys case, supra note 13.

22

23
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argument unequivocally: "Before us is a list of candidates whose aim is the
liquidation of the State of Israel."24
The available sources regarding ElArds objectives are quite limited. Most
standard sources that are usually used to evaluate the platforms and objectives
of political movements and parties were either not created or not preserved
with respect to El Ard.25 One source that survived and has been used by the
authorities in legal action against El Ard are the one-time pamphlets that the
movement published under different names towards the end of 1959 and the
beginning of 1960, for the publication of which several ElArd members were
tried. The general tone of the pamphlets was of appreciation for pan-Arab
nationalism: "The Arab revival movement, which awoke at the beginning of
the current century, is now storming with awesome force and striking out at
foreign influence... It will do its best for the freedom and unity of the Arab
world from the Persian Gulf to the Atlantic Ocean and it is clear that victory is
assured."2 6 The Jewish national movement was treated differently: "World
Zionism saw in the [United Nation's] partition plan a first basic step in the
implementation of its plans in the Arab world and was satisfied for the moment
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Three standard types of records are not available in the case of El Ard: party
newspapers, Parliamentary protocols of debates, and protocols of internal discussions
within the movement. Since the movement was not allowed to issue a newspaper, we
do not possess the party newspaper which is an important source. Since the leaders
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official positions of the movement, of its leaders, its various factions, and its internal
organs (if there were any such).
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with a portion of the land, while it secretly plotted to swallow all of Palestine
and to prepare in this way the country to serve as a bridgehead for the conquest
of the other Arab states." 27 The refugee question received great attention in the
pamphlets, with a demand for the recognition of the right of return. The writer
dismissed Ben-Gurion's proposal to participate in the relocation of the refugees
in the Arab states as a proposal that will persuade only people "at the mental
level of a female cook at Sde Boker" (a reference who Ben Gurion's wife, who
lived in kibbutz Sde Boker). The writer dismissed the claim that there was no
room for the refugees by reminding the readers of the great Jewish immigration
and the intention of absorbing three million Jews from Russia. The writer
answered the claim that the refugees hated Jews with the following: "According
to your own 'good' judgment, what is your right to live in the heart of the Arab
orient while you abhor its residents and spread hatred between them and your
people." 28 The sheets contained some comparisons between Jewish and Nazi
rule, and threats as to what was awaiting the Jews and their state: "This negative
view of Arab nationalism will by itself, in our view, seal the dark fate of this
people." "It should not be allowed to fade from the mind of Israel's rulers that
it is time to solve this problem (the problem of the Palestinian Arabs) in a just
way before another sword will solve it, and a what a sword this will be!"29 The
sheets did not specify who would bring these threats to fruition and what was
required of the Jews, other than the return of the refugees, to remove the threat.
They mentioned the foreignness of the Jews in the Arab east; furthermore,
there was no recognition of the existence of a Jewish state, so that it appeared
that even after the right of return was implemented, the Jews would not have a
right to exist within the framework of a state - Jewish, bi-national, or democratic
- that was not part of the Arab nation, and it was possible that there would be
no place for them in the Arab world as individuals either. 0
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The political commitment of El Ard to pan-Arab and Palestinian
nationalism should guide us in attributing concrete meaning to the somewhat
vague objective clauses and pamphlets. I believe that the political platform and
objectives of El Ard should be deduced from a combination of the general
political context discussed in the previous section, and the formal legal
documents and pamphlets discussed in the present section.
To summarise ElAris objectives and connections: the movement wanted
to change the status quo established in 1949. It sought the return of the refugees
and the return of the lands to their previous owners. It sought to change the
borders and establish an Arab state. It spoke loosely about the right of the State
of Israel to exist, but did not specify the conditions subject to which this state
would be recognised. In its statements, it supported Nassir's Egypt, which
proposed the destruction of Israel through the use of force and the establishment
of a Palestinian entity in the entire territory of Mandatory Palestine, but did not
explicitly support this component of the Egyptian policy. Egypt supported El
Ard in its statements and called on its constituents to vote for its list. There is a
similarity between the objectives of El Ard and the first sections of the
Palestinian National Charter. ElArd did not refer to the subsequent sections of
the Charter, which rejected the partition of the land, the recognition of any
type of national rights of the Jews, and the rights of Jews who arrived after
1947 to live in Israel. But there is no clear statement by ElArd opposing any of
it. ElArd did not call on its members to use force, but neither did it reject it or
oppose the use of force by others to further its objectives and the wishes of the
Palestinians and the Arabs. It did not call for a resolution of the conflict by
peaceful means only; however, its members do not seem to have been involved
in violence and did not make preparations for such involvement.

V.

The Choice of Litigation as a Pre-eminent Political Tactic

The legal struggle between the authorities and ElArd provides insight into
the patterns of political activity among the Arab minority before the abolition
of military rule. Arab political activity at that time was influenced by the legal
framework in which it operated. Using a range of legal means, the authorities
36
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had many ways of blocking political activity that appeared threatening to them.
The political activity of ElArd was restricted and regulated by these legal means,
some of which were discussed in earlier sections of this paper.
At the same time, ElArd chose to pursue a puzzling legal approach. The
movement could have cut all contact with the authorities and denied their
legitimacy through demonstrative disregard, public protest, civil disobedience,
or violence. But it chose to act within the rules of the Israeli political game and
test its limits.' El Ard may have been caught in this legal battle for lack of an
alternative. In some of the cases the movement was dragged into court by the
authorities. But the leeway that the law allowed El Ard for maneuvering was
small to begin with, and although any attempt to extend the activity resulted in
legal confrontation, it appears that the movement itself chose the tactics of
legal confrontation and succeeded in reaching the Supreme Court six times
between 1960 and 1965.32
ElArd was able to raise before the Supreme Court difficult questions of
principle (not an easy matter). Under the military administration, Arab political
activity in Israel was controlled through the Mandatory Defense (Emergency)
Regulations. The Regulations granted broad powers to the security agencies
and were used to limit the political activities of Arabs in Israel. It was possible
to object to injunctions based on these Regulations only through the courts of
the military administration, whose benches were composed of officers who were
not jurists.3 3 It was a difficult task to attack the implementation of these
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This pattern of operation resembles that of civil rights organisations in the US, such
as the ACLU and NAACP, especially regarding the rights of African-American people,
around the same time, that is, the years following Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), which ruled racial segregation in education to be illegal and paved
the way for frequent litigation by organisations representing the black population and
other minorities for the improvement of their conditions.
As of July 18, 1963, it was possible to appeal decisions of the military administration
courts through the regular military courts. See Jirys, supra note 9, at 40.
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Regulations through the High Court ofJustice, because the Court had repeatedly
stated in its decisions (since the establishment of the State of Israel) that it
would not interfere with the discretion of the security agencies when they issued
injunctions based on the Defense Regulations, but would limit itself to verifying
the authority of the agency that issued the injunction, and the observance of
the formal requirements necessary before and at the time when the injunctions
were issued." ElArd reached the Supreme Court despite the barrier posed by
the Defense Regulations," by succeeding in testing government actions that
were not based on the authority of the Defense Regulations 6 but on that of the
Company Law and the Ottoman Association Law, or were without legal
authorisation, as when the Central Elections Commission disqualified the El
Ard list.
The decision to pursue a legal tactic is not surprising in view of the
personalities involved. Most of the members of the group were intellectuals, or
at least people with academic education. Some claim that the movement started
at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, in the mid-1950s, indeed within the
Law School of that university, from where some of the ElArd members had
graduated." Sabri Jirys, one of the prominent members of the group, was a
graduate of the Hebrew University Law School. Jirys frequently initiated legal
actions, and in his writing, e.g., in his book Arabs in Israel, he demonstrates a
thorough understanding of the legal methods of action of Israeli authorities
towards the Arab minority. The group also enjoyed the continuous support of
Dr. Yaakov Yeredor, an attorney and founder of the Semitic Action group, and
one of the former leaders (before 1948) of the left-wing of the Fighters for the
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Freedom of Israel group (Leb).Yeredor represented the movement in the El
Ard Ltd., Jirys," and Yeredorm cases. In the Kardosh case,"1 the movement was
represented by attorney Hanna Nakara, a leader of Maki and one of the
prominent Arab lawyers of that time. Attorney Arie Marinsky represented
Qa'uqji, a party activist, and his five colleagues in the case bearing the latter's
name. It appears, therefore, that the leaders of El Ard were able to see the
potential of the legal battle, and were able to mobilise, in a variety of ways, the
necessary professional assistance to carry on the battle. It is likely that the legal
tactics of ElArdwere shaped byjirys and Yeredor. They played a role resembling
that of Thurgood Marshall's in the black civil rights movement in the U.S.
In the manner of political interest groups representing blacks, women, and
other minorities in the U.S, and that of similar groups in Israel during a later
period, ElArd chose to act through the judiciary because as a small minority
group, that was not considered a potential political partner, it understood that it
would not be able to achieve its goals through the executive or legislative
branches of government.42 Its tactics involved filing various requests with the
authorities, and when these responded to the challenge by rejecting the requests
and imposing restrictions on the movement, El Ard tested the restrictions in
the courts. The movement used this approach consistently, and did not miss an
opportunity to submit a petition or to appeal a decision, and proceeding to the
court of highest instance, the Supreme Court. It brought many difficult legal
challenges to the judicial branch. The purpose of the legal struggle was not
only to win the proceedings and pursue a given political activity, but also to
compel the security agencies to reveal their methods of oppression and
discrimination, to present the Supreme Court as part of the oppressive
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mechanism of the government, and to present before the Arab public a higher
level of activity than that of competing parties. 43 The legal campaign of ElArd,
and the Israeli state's attempt to suppress the movement, forced the Supreme
Court to address central constitutional and identity issues. I will begin, in
accordance with Samuel Issacharoff's scheme", with freedom of expression,
then move to freedom of association, and finally arrive at the right to be elected.

VI. Freedom of Expression
ElArd and its representatives succeeded in bringing about a discussion of
the extent of freedom of expression in three separate legal actions: first, in
defending the Qa'uqjicase,"5 in which criminal action was taken against several
members of the movement for publishing a newspaper without a permit; second,
in petitioning the Kardosh case," which addressed the legality of the refusal of
the Registrar of Companies to register a company whose objective was the
publication of newspapers; third, in petitioning the case of El Ard Ltd.,' in
which the Interior Ministry's Supervisor of the Northern District refused to
grant the company a permit to publish a weekly newspaper, even after it had
been allowed to incorporate.
When it started its activity, ElArd sought to publish a newspaper, as political
parties and movements at the time usually did, and requested permission to do
so from the District Supervisor. While awaiting a response, the movement started
printing "one-time" sheets, each with a different tide and editor to circumvent
the interdiction of the Press Ordinance. The sheets were widely distributed and
received considerable attention. Consequently, the Advisor to the Prime Minister
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on Arab Affairs called a news conference, warning about the dangers that the
activities of the movement represented to the state, and announced the
government's intention to take drastic steps against it. The publication was
subsequently shut down, and six of its editors were indicted and convicted in
trial court, a conviction upheld by the district court and the Supreme Court. 48
The District Supervisor eventually rejected ElAris request.
Despite ElArds attempt to place freedom of expression and of the press
in the centre of legal discussion, and despite the wide protection that this freedom
was laced with by virtue of the KolHa'am ruling of 1953,49 (in which the High
Court of Justice ordered the cancellation of the closure injunction issued by the
Interior Minister against the newspapers of the Communist Party), the Supreme
Court avoided addressing the extent or applicability of freedom of expression
in all three cases in which ElArd brought them up.
The proceedings in the Qa'uqi caseso before the Supreme Court were a
second-round appeal concerning the severity of punishment for the publication
of a newspaper without a permit. Attorneys for the defendants, Marinsky and
Segal, claimed in their appeal that the offences of the defendants were merely
technical: a failure to obtain permits for the publication of one-time sheets, and
that the severity of the punishment was influenced by the content of the
expression and not by the gravity of the offence. In this way, ElArd hoped to
expand the scope of the discussion to the content of the one-time sheets and
the limits of the freedom of expression. It was claimed that in the lower instances
the content of these sheets was not discussed based on facts, and that the
content in itself was not illegal. Refusal of the licence, it was claimed, denied
one of the basic rights of citizens of the state, and the severe punishment
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reflected the political views of the judges. The Attorney General helped the
Court by removing from the original indictment counts that were based on
provisions of the criminal law, such as incitement, which would have required a
discussion of the content of the sheets to bring about a conviction. Thus, the
Court could lower the fine imposed on four of the defendants and abstain from
addressing the political and constitutional claims of their attorneys."
In the Kardosh case, all the justices except Justice Agranat chose to address
the issue in the context of corporation and administrative law: the extent of the
authority and discretion of the Registrar of Companies. In the case of ElArd,
Ltd.,52 the attorney representing the claimant, Yaakov Yeredor, claimed that the
reason behind the refusal to grant the company a permit to publish a newspaper
was political discrimination, which represented severe injury to the freedom of
the press and freedom of speech. But here again, the-Supreme Court sitting as
High Court of Justice framed the question as one that came from the field of
administrative law: the extent of the authority of the District Supervisor and
the question whether he needed to provide reasons for his refusal to grant the
permit. 3 The Court refused to intervene in the decision to refuse the movement
a permit to publish a newspaper, and stated that it was not qualified to address
the broader questions raised by the claimant regarding the injury to the freedom
of expression. These questions would have to be addressed to the legislators,
who were the only ones in a position to change the Mandatory Defense
Regulations.
Why did ElArd fail to publish its paper, while Maki succeeded in publishing
theirs, even when the authorities attempted to prevent them from doing so?
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The ElArd, Ltd.54 case is different from Kol Ha'amss in that the discussion did
not extend to newspapers that had been published legally and the dissemination
of which had been suspended (based on Section 19 of the Press Ordinance),"
but was limited to newspapers for the publication of which no licence had been
issued, as required under regulation number 94 of the Defense (Emergency)
Regulations of 1945." The presence of two separate legal frameworks allowed
the Court to establish a relatively broad freedom of expression for Jewish political
movements whose papers, most of the time, already had licences to publish or
had no difficulty obtaining them. The legal questions regarding these papers
focused on whether censorship and sanctions can be exercised in their case to
restrict their freedom of expression ex postfacto. By contrast, the freedom of
expression of Arab political movements, which had to obtain licences, could be
restricted, and the legal question in their case was whether it was possible to
intervene in the administrative decision to deny them such a licence."
The separation between the two frameworks was not entirely dichotomous.
Makfs Arabic publication, Al-Ittibad, fell into the first legal category, intended
apparently for Jewish publications, as it served a binational party; however, its
publication continued unencumbered even after it became Rakah's newspaper.
The same attorney, Hanna Nakara, represented both Al-Ittibad in the Kol Ha'am
case 59 and ElArd in the Kardosh case60, in which ElArd asked for recognition of
its right to incorporation for the purpose of publishing its newspaper; however,
he was unable to reach similar results in both cases. The different legal
frameworks allowed the court to reach different decisions without being accused
of discriminating against Arab expression.
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Moreover, the regional and international context within which the freedom
of expression of the two movements was discussed, in 1953 in the first case,
and in 1959-64 in the second, was vastly different. Between the two time frames,
dramatic changes had taken place: in the Soviet Union, Stalin's death; in Egypt,
the revolution and the rise of Nasser; in Israel, the ousting of Ben-Gurion and
his retirement, the Sinai war, and more. The publication of Kol Ha'am and AlIttibad created problems in Israel's relations with a great power; and El Ards
publications created problems in the context of the Jewish-Arab conflict. But it
is not clear that the authorities perceived the threat to the security of the state
caused by the publication of Kol Ha'am to be less than that caused by the El
Ard publications."
It appears that between the middle of the first and second decades after
the creation of the Israeli state, there was a change in the way the Supreme
Court balanced freedom of expression with the security threat to the state. It
gave state security greater consideration, but without explicitly changing the
balancing formula that it created with the Kol Ha'am case.62 It was easy for the
Court to effect this change because in the ElArd, Ltd. decision it was asked to
examine the actions of the District Supervisor on the basis of Regulation 94 of
the Defense Regulations. The different legal framework allowed the court not
to mention the Kol Ha'am decision6 4 at all, and the centrality of freedom of
expression and of the probabilistic test which were at the centre of Justice
Agranat's ruling in the KolHa'am case. ElArd was not able to force the Court to
discuss the content of its publications and the question of whether they
represented a threat of any kind to the security of the state. The movement
succeeded in raising the question of freedom of expression for the Arab minority
in Israel and the injury to it, although not in affecting in the Supreme Court's
decision.
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VII. Freedom of Association
At the time in Israel, two main types of corporate associations were available
by law. The first was the corporation and the second was the Ottoman
association. The first was based on the 1929 British Mandatory Companies
Ordinance, and was used primarily for business purposes. The second was based
on the 1909 Ottoman Associations Law, and was used primarily for the formation
of NGOs and other non-business entities.6 5
The Kardosh case66 raised the question of ElAnts freedom of associating
into a corporation. In April 1960, several El Ard members submitted to the
Registrar of Companies the forms required to register a company named "El
Ard Company, Ltd." Based on a description of the facts included in the decision,
the Registrar, after examining the Department of Justice and police files, and
after obtaining the opinion of the Attorney General, refused to register the
company, relying on Section 14 of the Companies Ordinance that allowed him
to refuse registering a company "according to his absolute discretion."
Justice Agranat accepted the Attorney General's opinion that the court
should intervene in the broad discretion granted to the Registrar of Companies
only in extreme and rare circumstances. However, it decided that this was one
such case on the ground that the refusal to register the company was not reached
for the ends to which the discretion was granted. The Registrar did not have the
authority to censure or supervise the press; this activity was regulated by the
Press Ordinance of 1933 which granted the authority to issue licences for the
publication of a newspaper to the District Supervisor, and by the Defense
Regulations, which granted the authority to prohibit the publication of certain
materials to the censor. Agranat repeated what he had said in the Kol Ha'am
case' about the high social value associated with freedom of expression, which
could be curtailed only by those whom the legislation has explicitly empowered
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to do so. The Registrar of Companies was not authorised by law to restrict the
freedom of expression and to protect the security of the state. Therefore, in
this case, it was held that the Registrar acted for a flawed reason and his refusal
to register the company was void.
In a short ruling, Justice Vitkon joined Agranat and stated that Section 14
authorised the Registrar to apply considerations within the realh of company
law. He added that employees of other state agencies "can no doubt prevent
the publication of incitement and destructive propaganda, and they are more
knowledgeable and efficient in their work than the respondent [the Registrar]
can be." Nevertheless, Justice Vitkon opened a breech for the application of
security considerations by reference to Section 4 of the ordinance, which states
that companies must be established for legal purposes only. Justice Cohn,
however, stated that the discretion granted by the legislators to the registrar is
absolute and there is no basis in law for court intervention in its application.
The Court should, therefore, not exceed the limits set by legislation and not
specify situations in which the Registrar's decisions are voided. In sum, with a
dissent opinion, the Court ordered the Registrar to register El Ard Company,
Ltd.
Gideon Hausner, the then Attorney General, asked the Supreme Court for
a further consideration of this decision. It is important to note that Israel's
Supreme Court did not rule en banc. It normally sat in panels of three justices
out of the nine to eleven presiding justices. A further consideration was held by
an extended panel, usually by adding two justices and making a panel of five
justices. The Chief Justice was well positioned to influence the final outcome
both by deciding whether to allow further consideration and by deciding who
would be the justices that would be added to the panel. In this further
consideration, in which the Attorney General Hausner personally represented
the Registrar of Companies, Justice Sussman added his vote to the majority and
Chief Justice Olshan to Justice Cohn's minority opinion. It is apparent that in
this case the Chief Justice did not manipulate the final decision. Thus, the
decision to order the Registrar of Companies to register the El Ard Company
stood with a three-to-two majority.
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The two decisions, Kardosh v. The Registrar of Companies 68 and Further
Consideration The Registrar of Companies v. Kardosh, 69 given in 1961 and 1962, are
often treated independently of the sequence of decisions relating to the ElArd.
Legal scholars regard the Kardosh decision as a declaration of the principle of
freedom of association in Israel."o None of these scholars mention the fact that
in November 1964, El Ard Company, Ltd. was declared an illegal association
by the Ministry of Defense." Nor is it mentioned that shortly afterward, the
Haifa District Court granted the request of the Attorney General to forfeit the
company's assets and dissolve the company.72 Only by viewing the Kardosh ruling
in isolation from other decisions of the Supreme Court and from government
actions regarding the ElArd movement, can Kardosh be considered a pinnacle
and important landmark in the Supreme Court's readiness to develop rights and
freedoms and to protect citizens from the authorities.
Documents in the State Archive demonstrate that while it decided the fate
of the El Ard Company, the Kardosh ruling did not affect significantly the status
of freedom of association in Israel." It turns out that in the beginning of the
1950s, requests for an association in which one or more of the founders lived in
the territories of the military administration were approved by the Registrar of
Companies only after he obtained, as instructed by the Attorney General, the
approval of the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry of Justice in turn obtained the
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approval of the military administration, which quite likely obtained the approval
of the General Security Services.'
Apparently, the Kardosh FurtherConsiderationdenied the Minister of Justice
and all those under him the authority, which they believed they had, to prevent
the formation of a company for reasons of state security." But this was not
how matters were perceived in the Ministry of Justice. In a detailed opinion
written for the Attorney General, Zvi Tarlo (who as Deputy Attorney General
represented the Registrar of Companies before the Supreme Court in two rounds
of the Kardosh case) and Michel Chasin of the State Prosecutor's office (a future
Supreme Court Justice), reached an opposite conclusion.' According to their
analysis, Justice Agranat was alone in his opinion on the central issue under
discussion here, and the four other justices did not accept his opinion. According
to the opinion of Tarlo and Chasin, none of the four other justices stated that
the Registrar of Companies was prohibited from using security considerations. 7
The bottom line of the opinion is that even after the Kardosh FurtherConsideration
there was no need to change the existing arrangement whereby applications for
association of Arabs living under military rule were submitted for the evaluation
of the security agencies, and whereby the Registrar of Companies was authorised
to refuse to register companies if "there is a reasonable basis to suspect that
behind the objectives listed in the articles of organisation an illegal objective is
being concealed."7
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In subsequent years, the Registrar continued the procedure, as evidenced by the
many letters in the file, in which he furnished the information about requests for
incorporation to the ministry, which then passed it on to the military administration
before the association was registered. In the end, in 1966, with the abolition of the
military administration, it was neither the judiciary nor the legislative branch that
stopped the practice. The military authorities in a trivial internal note ordered the
companies registrar, through the Ministry ofJustice, to stop the practice of reviewing
incorporation applications by Arab citizens of Israel.
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Approximately two years after the right of members of ElArd to form an
organisation was established, they asked to incorporate an association named
"The ElArd Movement." According to the Ottoman Associations Law, there is
no need to obtain a permit for the association. The only requirement is to send
a notice, after the fact, about the association to the District Supervisor. After
receiving the notice, the supervisor sent a letter informing the members of El
Ard that "it is prohibited to establish an entity that pretends to call itself 'The
ElArd Movement,"' and "if it happens that despite the above you operate as a
body, legal action may be taken against you." The District Supervisor based his
opinion on Section 3 of the Ottoman Associations Law, which stated: "It is
prohibited to form associations against the law and the general morals, and
ones that the basis for which is illegal, or that are harmful to the peace and
integrity of the state, or against the state with the intention of changing its
current system of government or to divide ethnic groups for political purposes."
There was criticism against the use of Section 3. It was claimed that this
section was an anachronistic vestige of the Ottoman era, when the imperial
authorities were wary about separatist groups and conflicts that may flare up
between various ethnic and religious groups." It has also been claimed that
Section 3 could be applied to almost any political movement in Israel, and that
the Mapai government could use it against any Jewish political organisation in
opposition. Critics maintained that the Supervisor should have used Section 4
of the law, which prohibits political organisations founded on the basis of
nationality and race.'o But use of this section would also have been problematic,
because many of the political organisations in Israel were avowedly Jewish, and
some excluded Arabs. A sharper criticism maintained that neither section should
have been used: "It appears that the Haifa District Supervisor envied his
colleague, the Registrar of Companies, and decided to do something that would
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make the ElArd people the standard bearers in the struggle for the freedom of
democratic association in Israel."s'
Sabri Jirys, one of the directors of the association, appealed to the High
Court of Justice against the District Supervisor's decision. The three justices
who heard the case, Vitkon, Landau, and Berinson, agreed to reject the appeal
and uphold the prohibition against the incorporation of the ElArd movement.
The difference between the decision regarding incorporation as a company in
the Kardosh case, and incorporation as an association in the fitys case, stemmed
from a legal approach of unclear origin whereby limited liability companies, as
business organisations, warrant lesser state intervention in their affairs than
associations of a more political and social nature.82 But it also stemmed from
the fact that the association asked to participate in a broader range of activities,
including political activity, and not merely the publication of a newspaper."
Already at that time there was talk about the movement contemplating
participation a year later in the Knesset elections, and it is possible that the
Court was influenced in its decision by this possibility as well. Moreover, the
association's objectives were described in its charter more clearly and explicitly
than in the articles of organisation of the El Ard Company, which made it
easier for the Court to justify its decision to uphold the prohibition of the
association.
It appears that the announcement by ElArd about its association and the
itemised list of its objectives were intended to test the government and the
Court. ElArd members could have continued to operate within the framework
of the existing company or on an unincorporated basis. Furthermore, it was not
necessary to form an association to participate in the elections, since lists of
individual candidates (and not incorporated parties) ran for the Knesset. Finally,
they could have formulated a charter containing only three or four of the six
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objectives that were included. The objectives dealing with "raising the
educational, scientific, health, economic, and political level of its members",
with the "establishment of full equality and social justice among all segments
of the population of Israel", with "action to achieve peace in the Middle East
in particular and in the world in general", and even with "support for all
progressive movements worldwide that oppose imperialism, and support for all
peoples that attempt to free themselves from it" would most likely not have
angered the authorities and the High Court of Justice. These objectives would
have permitted the association a wide range of activities in the political arena
as well.
However, members of the movement wanted to include two other
objectives which discussed the mode of the solution of the Palestinian problem
and supported a certain movement in the Arab world. These objectives were at
the centre of the discussion in the High Court of Justice, and eventually caused
the prohibition of the association.8 4 The El Ard people were interested in
including these objectives, although in a somewhat hazy formulation, to test
the authorities."' They did not place their hopes in the District Supervisor, given
his past record." The more meaningful test seemed to be that before the Supreme
Court. Following the FurtherConsideration ofKardosh, the Supreme Court looked
like the right arena. If they could not secure the support of the High Court of
Justice, they could at least embarrass it and expose its Zionist leanings."
Contributing to the change in the Court's ruling were the development of
El Ard and the expansion of its objectives on one hand, and the growing
Nasserite threat on the other." The change is manifest in the Court's shift from
a formal or even formalistic discussion in the Kardosh case to a discussion of
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values in the jigs case. It is a mistake to maintain, as some jurists do," that the
Kardosh decision takes a broader view of the right of association and of the
freedom of expression than the jigs decision.
The Kardosh case deals with the authority of the Registrar of Companies
and with the interpretation of Section 14 of the Companies Ordinance. In the
Kardosh case, the rights are in the margins. In the first round, only Justice Agranat
attaches importance to the freedom of expression and association on his way to
a decision. Here the Supreme Court gives the authorities a lesson on dealing
with ElArd. It states that rather than prohibiting its incorporation, they must
deny it a licence to publish a newspaper based on their authority under the
Press Ordinance, and censor its publications based on their authority under the
Defense Regulations. If the authorities still want to prevent its incorporation,
they ought to use Section 4 of the ordinance and not Section 14. But the Court
does not undertake a substantive discussion of the objectives of ElArd.
In the Jiys case," however, the objectives of El Ard are at the centre of
the discussion, together with the politics of the Jewish-Arab conflict, partly
because the movement pushed the Court in that direction, and partly because
the justices feel a strong need to bring the issue into view. Justices Vitkon and
Landau are not content in the jigs case with a literal commentary on the two
problematic sections in the ElArd objectives; they interpret these sections in
light of the broader context of the Jewish-Arab conflict. Says Justice Landau:
The court is entitled to use its information about what is happening in
the world, especially in this part of the world, as matters of public
knowledge that do not require evidence. The concepts "the liberation
movement, union and socialism in the Arab world," and their joining
together, have a clear and well-defined meaning in the contemporary
political lexicon."
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The Court interprets this expression, present in the charter, based on the
justices' personal understanding of the reality they experience as Jews living in
Israel in the year 1964. In addition, the justices are using press reprints and
radio broadcasts from the Arab world, supplied to them by the Attorney General
to reveal the true objectives, in their view, of the ElArd movement. But the
justices reject the Attorney General's offer to peruse classified material regarding
the ElArd movement and its founders:
In order not to deprive the claimant of his rights, we decided at the
time not to accept this material as long as we were not convinced
based on the material open for all to see that the claimant was in the
right, so in any case we do not need it now, after we see clearly from
the unclassified material that the claim is to be rejected.92
The Court chose not to inspect the classified material in order to create the
impression of equality between the parties contending before it. It was the jigs
and not the Yeredordecision that signaled the shift in the Supreme Court's attitude
towards El Ard. In the Yeredor case," the justices merely continued that line,
relying heavily on the Jiys discussion of the objectives of the movement.

VIII. Liberty to Contest Election
In 1959, shortly after the formation of the El Ard movement, elections
were held for the fourth Knesset. ElArd's position, as reflected in the first issue
of its publication, in October of the same year, was against participation, and
the sheet called on the Arab minority in Israel to boycott the elections. 4 This
caused great concern among the leaders of Maki. ElArd did not take part in the
elections to the fifth Knesset, in 1961, but there is no evidence whether or not
it called for a boycott. On September 3, 1965, Yaakov Yeredor, representative
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of the ElArd movement, presented to the Elections Commission to the Sixth
Knesset a list of ten candidates that chose the deluding name "The Socialists
List.'.' First on the list were Salih Baransi, Habib Qa'uqji, and Sabri Jirys, and
the last one was Mansur Kardosh - all of them known figures from earlier legal
confrontations of El Ard. This was a country-wide list representing various
classes associated with ElArd. Six of the candidates were among the founders
of the El Ard Ltd. Company, incorporated according to law following the decision
of the High Court of Justice in the Kardosh case," and which was subsequently
declared by the Defense Minister as an illegal association. Five of the candidates
were among the originators of the El Ard association, the establishment of
which was prohibited by the Haifa District Supervisor. With the list of candidates
were submitted seven booklets containing 750 signatures as required by the
Knesset Election Law.96
Two contradictory explanations can be adduced for El Ards change of
approach with regard to the elections. One maintains that the decision to run
followed from the movement's acceptance of the basic rules of Israeli democracy
and a desire to have a say in it, and perhaps also recognition of Israel's legitimacy.
The other maintains that it was the result of an absence of alternatives and not
of choice, as the authorities and the courts had pulled the plug on all other
activities of the movement. A related explanation claims that the leaders of the
movement wanted to take advantage of the election to obtain the immunity
granted to members of Knesset from limitations imposed on their activities and
from indictment for these activities.
In any case, the movement's decision to run presented a serious challenge
first to the Central Elections Commission and subsequently to the Supreme
Court. The Knesset Elections Law," as well as the Basic Law: The Knesset,"
9
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have defined certain technical requirements for a list of candidates, but no
conditions or restrictions regarding their objectives or platforms. When it became
clear that there was opposition on the part of representatives of various parties
in the Elections Commission to the acceptance of El Ard, the first question
that arose was whether the Commission had the authority to discuss the matter
and rule on it.
Although the issue of the legitimacy ofJewish and Arab political movements
arose for the first time soon after the establishment of the State of Israel, no
substantive restrictions on the right to vote and to be elected were specified in
the Elections Ordinance for the Constituent Assembly" (which became the
first Knesset). Neither have such restrictions been specified in subsequent election
laws. Even when the Knesset passed permanent legislation in this area (Basic
Law: Knesset,'oo in 1958 and the Knesset Elections Law,'0' in 1959), the situation
remained unchanged: the legislation addressed technical and procedural details,
but placed no restrictions on the lists of candidates based on their objectives.
After elections to the fifth Knesset in 1961, the Chairman of the Elections
Commission, Zvi Berinson, sent a memorandum to the Prime Minister in which
he pointed out several deficiencies and omissions in the law and proposed the
creation of a committee to recommend remedies.' 02 Discussion of the Berinson
recommendations in the Ministry of Justice continued through most of the term
of the fifth Knesset. And although the El Ard movement was already under
way during this period, the possibility of placing restrictions on what constituted
a submittable list of candidates, or on the authority of the Elections Commission
to disqualify a list was not raised during the discussions.' It is possible that the
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hidden assumption was that ElArd and similar movements would not reach the
stage of submitting lists of candidates to Knesset elections because the
authorities would be able to stop them during their formative stage through the
Ottoman Association Law, the Mandatory Defense Regulations,o' and the Israeli
Prevention of Terror Ordinance.0 5
The lack of provisions within the law for the disqualification of lists of
candidates did not deter the members of the Elections Commission to the sixth
Knesset. The line-up of forces regarding ElArdwas unlike that regarding military
rule. Most of the parties united against Mapai in their opposition to military
rule. In the disqualification of ElArd, Mapal was joined by the other Zionist
parties.Representatives of Maki and Rakah in the commission opposed the
disqualification of ElArd,although Rakah people claimed that Makfs opposition
to the disqualification was only lip service. Others claimed that Rakah also
hoped to see ElArd disqualified to boost its own chances in the elections.
As has been shown above, the differences between the platforms of Rakab
and ElArd have led to competition between the two parties for the affections
of Arab intellectuals, for the support of Arab states, and for the votes of Arab
voters. Incidentally, Rakah did not appear to fear that the disqualification of El
Ard would lead to its own disqualification later.'06 For several reasons, the
authorities treated Rakah with less hostility.o' Injury to the party could have
had negative repercussions for Israel's relations with the Soviet Union. The
party even served as a conduit between the governments of Israel and of the
Soviet Union with respect to Middle Eastern affairs and matters relating to
Soviet Jewry. Rakab was a faction of a movement that had contested every
election and it would have been difficult to justify its sudden disqualification.
Meir Wilner, one of its leaders, was among the signatories of the Declaration
of Independence and a member of Knesset since.
104

Defense (Emergency Regulations), supra note 15.

105

Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 1948, 1 LSI 76 (1948) (Isr.).
LANDAU, supra note 9.

106
107

Id.

56

State Ideniy, TerritorialIntegrity and Pary Banning

The chairperson of the Central Elections Commission, Justice Landau,
0 o It appears
played a key role in the Commission's decision to disqualify ElArd.'
that Justice Landau not only chaired the discussions of party representatives,
but also led and structured them. He reached the conclusion that the commission
was authorised to disqualify a list, offered criteria for disqualification, and
maintained that ElArd met those criteria. He said:
We are not meeting here as a court of law, and therefore do not demand
proof as a court would, based on the rules of evidence. We can be
content with less... And the Supreme Court, in my opinion, will uphold
the position of this commission... Our function is to designate the
border... And in my opinion it is possible and necessary to designate
this border.
He also created the legal pattern which, in his opinion, granted the
Commission the authority to disqualify a list of candidates by a combined
interpretation of the Basic Law: The Knesset,' 9 the Knesset Elections Law,"o
and the Ottoman Association Law. He summarises the case thus:
"Organisations that deny the existence of the state should not join
the Knesset, the sovereign body in the country... These are basic
concepts of our constitutional regime, which we are entitled to include
among the sections of the Knesset Elections Law."

108

The protocols of the Elections Commission were not found. They are not in the
state archive, at the Knesset, or at the Supreme Court. Consequently, the most reliable
source about the positions of the various parties on the disqualification of ElArd,
about the evidence presented before the commission regarding the ElArd platform,

and about the role played by Justice Landau in the discussion is not available. Therefore,
the above discussion is based only on the portions of discussion that are quoted in
109

no

the Yeredor decision.
Basic Law: The Knesset, supra note 98.
Knesset Elections Law, supra note 97.

57

Vol. 4

Sodo-LegalReview

2008

Justice Landau made frequent references to the jirys decision"' during his
presentations before the Commission; he was the Senior Justice on that case.
He had known the ElArd members for at least five years since he wrote the
decision in the Qa'uqii case"2 towards the end of 1960. He did not hesitate to
express his opinion regarding the manner in which the Supreme Court was
expected to react to the Commission's decision. There is no doubt that the
authority with which he presented his factual position and legal conclusions
influenced the Commission's decision. He also influenced the Attorney General
who adopted his position and reasoning in his arguments before the Supreme
Court in the Yeredor case."' It is likely that Justice Landau's opinion has helped
form the positions of his colleagues in the Supreme Court."' Landau's central
role in the ElArd affair has not been properly assessed.
The ElArds decision to run in the elections to the sixth Knesset presented
the toughest challenge till date to the Supreme Court. The primary reason for
this was that no restrictions had been enacted on the right to be elected. Second,
the High Court of Justice had not been asked previously to decide on the matter.
It had to do so for the first time, seventeen years after the establishment of the
State, without any case law to rely on. Third, Justice Landau had put the weight
of all his prestige behind the decision of the Central Elections Commission.
Fourth, owing to the proximity of the elections, the Court had only four days,
including the Sabbath and a holiday, to decide. Fifth, much was at stake: on one
hand, a basic constitutional right, and on the other, the fear that if the restriction
is not put in place at that time, it will not be possible to do so after the candidates
are elected to the Knesset and acquire immunity.
The Court ruled and established the important precedent that the right to
be elected in Israel is restricted and can be denied to a list of candidates whose
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objective is to place on the agenda the question of the destruction of the State
and the denial of its sovereignty. But the Court could not have reached this
decision through a formalistic line of argumentation based on the explicit language
of the law or of legal precedents; it needed interpretive acrobatics, which
exposed its ideological leanings. The majority judges, Justices Agranat and
Sussman, overcame the absence of basis for the disqualification of a list of
candidates in the Knesset Elections Law by basing it on other sources: the
historical narrative of Judaism and Zionism, the holocaust, the Declaration of
Independence, Abraham Lincoln's correspondence to Congress"', lessons from
the history of the Weimar Republic, and literature on statehood theory.
Justice Agranat's solution was especially interpretive: the laws of the state,
in particular its constitutional laws, must be interpreted in light of the
"constitutional given... that the State of Israel is lasting and that its continuing
existence and eternity are not in question." For Justice Sussman, the solution
lay in the recognition of supreme principles found in positive law and even
above the Constitution, which can be called "natural law." They both went
beyond Justice Landau's position, who proposed a standard interpretation of
the election laws"' in combination with the association law.
Justice Haim Cohn, in his minority view, interpreted the Knesset Election
Law literally and found no authorisation for the Elections Commission or the
Supreme Court to disqualify a list of candidates based on its objectives. He
maintained that the disqualification should be voided and added a
recommendation to the legislators to define by law the authority to disqualify a
list of candidates, in the manner done by the German Constitution after the
Second World War."'
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Most of the above discussion of ElArs objectives is not an attempt to
understand in retrospect what contemporaries were not able to grasp. It is based
primarily on freely available sources that are not classified or locked up in
archives, and on studies based on open sources. These sources include court
decisions, statements made by politicians, material from Israeli newspapers,
including those of Maki, Rakah, and El Ard."' This means that the picture
presented above, if the mosaic has been assembled correctly, is similar to that
received by the Israeli public, the Attorney General, and the justices of the
Supreme Court during the period under investigation. The question as to whether
the disqualification of ElArd was proper must be viewed in this light.
The discussion of El Ards objectives complicates the question of the
movement's disqualification. The movement did not use violence and did not
call for it. It did not call for the abolition of basic democratic rule in Israel, and
showed no signs that if it were to come to power in Israel it intended to cancel
democracy, which already shows that the analogy with Weimar is problematic.
It is not clear whether ElArd supported the continued existence of Israel or
recognised its right to exist. But it is difficult to maintain that the movement, in
1965, posed a threat to the existence of the state with any degree of certainty.
If it were to join with external Arab forces at the time of war, would it make the

"

Nearly all the secondary sources used in this article are of Jewish origin - whatever
bias this may involve. These sources base their discussion partly on openly available

Arab sources. The publication of secondary research in Arabic and of archival material
by Arab countries or by the Palestinians may change the picture. Publication of the
memoirs of former ElArd activists can also shed more light on the objectives of the
movement. Publication of information held by the Shabak and by other Israeli
government agencies, if it should ever happen, may require a reevaluation of the
conclusions presented in this paper. On 18.1.2002, Ha'aret reported that in 2001
Nachman Tal completed a Ph.D. thesis at the Haifa University with a dissertation
entitled "Changes in security policy toward the Arab minority 1948-1967." Nachman
Tal served in the Shabak since 1955 and eventually came to head the Arab desk

there. This academic work, which could serve as an important secondary source for
the present study, has exceptionally been classified, and its only copy is held at Shabak
headquarters.
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military threat faced by Israel more severe? It is difficult to believe that in such
a case a few ElArd members of Knesset would count for much, compared with
Nasser's call to arms on one hand, and compared with suppression by Israeli
security forces on the other.
Therefore, Ruth Gavison reasonably claims that what was at stake in the
Yeredor case, and perhaps already in the fiys case, was not the security aspect,
the clear and present danger to the state. What was at stake was the fundamental
incompatibility of ElAris objectives with the basic values of the state."' The
question was: What is the threshold beyond which a movement cannot participate
in the state's political process because the gap between its values and those of
the state is too great? The answer of majority of the Justices was that the gap
between the values of ElArd and those of the state was too wide, which denied
them the right to participate in the political dialogue of the election campaign
and the Knesset. But the courts didn't specify where exactly the borderline was.
Are only such movements that propose the establishment on the entire
territory of Mandatory Palestine of an Arab Palestinian state, which is part of
the Arab nation to be disqualified? Is it possible to disqualify any movement
that proposes a change in the country's 1949 borders, for example by
implementing the UN Partition Plan of 1947? Does a call for the return of all
the refugees create a gap that justifies disqualification? Is the issue of the means
others intend to use to implement objectives they share with the movement
relevant, for example, in a situation in which the movement does not call for
the use of violence by its members but supports (or does not condemn) such
use by others who share its objectives? Is cooperation with entities outside
Israel for the furtherance of the objective enough to disqualify the movement?
These and other questions remained unanswered by the Yeredor decision.'
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The interpretive move used in the Yeredor rulingl 21 points towards two
important phenomena in the shaping of the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
in the second decade of the state. The Court did not see itself closely bound by
the language of legislation as it did in the first decade, but, when it did, it
interpreted the legislations more freely to meet its objectives. Consequently, the
court placed itself in a position that would enable it to intervene and define the
extent of discretion of the executive branch. It took away from the Registrar of
Companies the absolute discretion which it was granted by the legislators, but
granted substantive discretion to the Knesset Elections Commission despite
the fact that the law authorised the Commission only to examine the technical
compliance of the documents submitted by the lists of candidates.
In the case of the restriction of the right to be elected, the Court went one
step further in freeing itself from the letter of the law by recognising the principles
of natural law and unwritten constitutional principles. The special characteristic
of these vague principles is that it is the Court that defines their content, as
they are not the result of legislation, and that legislation is subject to them.
Nevertheless, the Court did not subject laws passed by the Knesset to judicial
review based on these principles. It only interpreted the laws with reference to
these principles. To disqualify the El Ard list, the Court effected towards the
end of the second decade of its existence, a dramatic shift in the constitutional
theory and interpretation canons by which it operated. The question is whether
this was a local, instrumental shift for the purpose of achieving a desired
ideological objective in the case at hand, or a basic shift that was part of a
broader trend, reflected in court decisions in a range of areas.
It is possible that the shift in the Court's attitude towards ElArd resulted
not from the movement's objects and actions, or from the appointment of Justice
Agranat as President, but rather from a shift in the Court's perception of the
nature of the threat, which was affected by the growing pan-Arab enthusiasm
and the inflammatory rhetoric calling for the destruction of Israel. The Justices
may not have excelled in analysing Israel's strategic position: its military strength,
121
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its developing nuclear capability, the reality of the threat to its water sources,
and the danger in the terrorist incursions. They had neither the information nor
the expertise to do so. They may have been able to form an opinion about the
desired boundaries of political discourse, but not regarding the probability of
an actual threat from the part of ElArd to the existence of the State of Israel.
Real and perceived threats are the prime causes for the banning of political
parties. The question whether courts can tell one from the other, and should
they be expected to do so, must be central to any discussion of the role of the
courts in restricting political activity.

Afterword
ElArds political activities came to an end with the ban on its participation
in the 1965 elections. Shortly thereafter two of its leaders left Israel. The symbolic
dismantling of the military rule in 1966 and more than this the 1967 war that
brought under Israeli military rule the West Bank and the Gaza strip with their
large Palestinian population, dramatically changed the position of the Arab
minority in Israel.
The next attempt by an Arab nationalist party to participate in the general
election took place only nineteen years and five election campaigns later, in
1984. One of its two leaders, Muhammad Miari was a former activist in El Ard.
The party Hareshima Hamitkademet Leshalom ("The Progressive List for Peace")
was different from ElArd in the sense that it had also a Jewish leader and that
it favoured a two states solution. Yet it shared with ElArd the aim to form an
Arab nationalist party that would have no Communist or Zionist affiliations.
Several Jewish parties challenged its right to participate in the elections; the
Central Elections Commission decided to ban it from participation, but the
Supreme Court overturned that decision and approved its participation.'22 In
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1985, the Basic Law that sets and regulates elections to the Knesset was amended
to allow the banning of parties on the grounds of denial of the State of Israel as
the State of the Jewish People, denial of its democratic character or incitement
to racism. The banning of Arab political parties based on the amended Basic
Law has been suggested by right wing Jewish parties before most elections since
1984.123 It has not been upheld by the Supreme Court so far.
Few movements and organisations, if any, have had such far-reaching impact
on the shaping of Israeli constitutional law. This remarkable accomplishment
was achieved by a small Arab national political movement, with scarce financial
or other resources. The case of ElArd is arguably the most interesting case in
the history of banning of political parties in Israel. It is also a crucial episode in
the history of freedom of speech and freedom of association in Israel. Presenting
the story as interplay between an active and initiating political movement and
the Supreme Court gives rise to a constitutional narrative quite different from
the traditional one in which the Supreme Court, on its own initiative, expands
rights and protections. It also emphasises the role of the Arab minority and the
conflict in shaping Israel's Constitution. This is a case study that can be used for
a revision of Israeli constitutional history.
The case of ElArd illuminates a profound question: should there be an
undisputable core identity to democratic states? That asserted identity c:n be
secular or liberal. It can be cultural, ethnic or national. It can be one of
attachment to specific historical narratives, to collective memory, or to the
correcting past injustice. This question is presented in its boldest form when
the disputant political movement does not intend to use violence in order to
bring about the change in core identity and when it does not wish to democratic
form of government in that state. The complexity of El Ards story and the
thickness of the narrative provide valuable insights for policy discussions. These
can be used with respect to the analysis of the objectives of parties, the means
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they intend to use, the relevance of their success prospects, their attitude towards
the use of violence, towards external political entities, and the different sets of
issues in various realms in which they are being restricted and banned.
The case of El Ard demonstrates the difficulties in identifying whether
parties reject violence and whether they adhere to democratic form of
government. It shows that it is hard to find a pure case of an attempt to change
the core identity of a state with full commitment to democracy and with full
rejection of violence. Yet it demonstrates that the focus on banning parties that
aim at changing the identity of a state touches a very sensitive nerve, one that
at the same time exposes the identity of the state and the limits set on it
democratic participation. El Ard was a forerunner of the third generation of
banning issues, issues of state identity. These issues will occupy democracies
for years to come.
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